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CREDIBILITY LIMITED REVISION 
SVEN OVE HANSSON, EDUARDO LEOPOLDO FERME, JOHN CANTWELL, 
AND MARCELO ALEJANDRO FALAPPA 
Abstract. Five types of constructions are introduced for non-prioritized belief revision, i.e., belief 
revision in which the input sentence is not always accepted. These constructions include generalizations 
of entrenchment-based and sphere-based revision. Axiomatic characterizations are provided, and close 
interconnections are shown to hold between the different constructions. 
?1. Introduction. In conventional, AGM-style belief revision [1] the input sen- 
tence is always accepted. In non-prioritized belief revision, this requirement is 
relaxed. Most models of non-prioritized revision operate on belief bases [4, 9, 11, 
16, 17, 19]. A couple of proposals for belief sets (theories) have been put forward 
[3, 15], but a full treatment including axiomatic characterizations of alternative con- 
structions has been lacking. The purpose of the present paper is to fill this gap in 
the literature by presenting a wide array of alternative constructions and providing 
axiomatic characterizations that clarify their properties and their interconnections. 
The intuitive importance of this exercise should be evident; actual agents differ from 
the idealized agents of conventional belief change theory in often rejecting inputs 
that are offerred for revision. 
We will assume a language Y that is closed under truth-functional operations 
and a consequence operator Cn for Y. Cn satisfies the standard Tarskian proper- 
ties, namely inclusion (A C Cn(A)), monotony (if A C B, then Cn(A) C Cn(B)), 
and iteration (Cn(A) = Cn(Cn(A))). It is supraclassical and compact, and sat- 
isfies deduction (if /l E Cn(A U {a}), then (a e -J) E Cn(A)). A F- a will be 
used as an alternative notation for a E Cn(A) and Cn(a) for Cn({a}). Upper- 
case letters denote subsets of 2. K denotes a set such that K = Cn(K) C 2. 
Lower-case Greek letters denote elements of Y. T is an arbitrary tautology 
and I an arbitrary contradiction. floa l is the set of inclusion-maximal consis- 
tent subsets of Y that have a as an element, and j1A f the set of inclusion- 
maximal consistent subsets of Y that include A. Furthermore, for any max- 
imal consistent subset Y of 2, Th(Y) a : Y C 11all}. We use o to 
denote (conventional or non-prioritized) revision operators in general, and * to 
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denote AGM revision. Furthermore, + denotes AGM expansion, i.e., K+a 
Cn(KU {a}). 
In Section 2, postulates for non-prioritized belief revision are proposed. In 
Section 3, five types of constructions for non-prioritized revision are proposed, and 
in Section 4 they are axiomatically characterized. 
?2. Postulates and their interrelations. The following postulates are used in AGM 
theory to characterize the operators of revision [1]: 
If K= Cn(K), then Koa = Cn(Koa) (closure). 
a E Koa (success). 
Koa C K+a (inclusion). 
If -, K, then Koa = K+a (vacuity). 
If a is consistent, then so is Koa (consistency). 
If a +-* 3l E Cn(0), then Koa = Ko/3 (extensionality). 
Ko (a A /l) C (Koa)?+l (superexpansion). 
If Koa Y -fl, then (Koa)?+l C Ko (a A /l) (subexpansion). 
The first six of these are the basic Gardenfors postulates and the last two the 
supplementary Gardenfors postulates. The latter are closely connected with the 
following three postulates: 
(Koa) 0 Kol3) C Ko (a V /l) (disjunctive overlap). 
If Ko(a V /l) i -,a, then Ko(a V /l) C Koa (disjunctive inclusion). 
Either Ko (a V /l) = Koa, Ko (a V /3) = Ko/l, or Ko (a V /l) (Koa) n (Ko/l) 
(disjunctive factoring). 
In the presence of the six basic postulates, superexpansion is equivalent with 
disjunctive overlap, subexpansion is equivalent with disjunctive inclusion, and dis- 
junctive factoring holds if and only if both disjunctive overlap and disjunctive 
inclusion hold [1, 5]. 
Our general approach will be to give up the success postulate while retaining 
as much as possible of the other Gardenfors postulates. The following are useful 
weakenings of the success postulate: 
Either Koa K or a E Koa (relative success). 
Either a E Koa or -a E Ko-'a (disjunctive success). 
If a E Koa and F- a - /l3, then /l3E Ko/3 (strict improvement). 
If/3 E Koa, then /l E Ko/3 (regularity). 
If -,if/Koa, then l3 E Ko/3 (strong regularity). 
If a V /3 E Ko(a V /3), then either a E Koa or /l E Ko/3 (disjunctive distribu- 
tion). 
Intuitively, we may call a sentence a credible, relative to a belief set K and a 
revision operator o for K, if and only if a E Koa. Under this interpretation, 
strict improvement says that credibility is inherited by logically weaker sentences, 
regularity that the resulting new belief state contains only credible sentences and 
strong regularity that it contains all sentences with incredible negations. 
The consistency postulate of AGM requires Koa to be consistent only when a is 
consistent. This is because the success postulate (a E Koa) is given higher priority 
than consistency. In non-prioritized belief revision, success is relaxed, and it is 
therefore natural to consider the following stronger consistency postulate: 
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Koa is consistent (strong consistency) [10]. 
We will also have use for some other properties related to consistency: 
If K is consistent, then Koa is consistent (consistency preservation) [15]. 
If both K and a are consistent, then so is Koa (weak consistency preservation) 
[13]. 
If K Z Koa, then KU (Koa) H- I (consistent expansion) [3]. 
Consistent expansion follows from vacuity and relative success. 
Subexpansion is a fairly plausible property for conventional (prioritized) belief 
revision, but it is much less so for non-prioritized revision. This can be seen from 
examples such that /fl K, -,/f K, a Koa, and a A /\ 3Ko(a A /3) (for instance, let 
a denote that there is a living dinosaur in Australia and /l that there is a living 
tree in Australia of a species that existed at the time of the dinosaurs). Such a 
pattern cannot simultaneously satisfy subexpansion, relative success, and closure 
(from a VKoa and relative success follows Koa = K. Since -,/f 3K we then have 
-,i/fKoa, and due to closure, Koa Y -'/3, so that by subexpansion /l E Ko(a A /3). 
Since /3?K it follows from relative success that aA /A l E Ko(a A /3), contrary to 
the conditions). This problem can be avoided if we replace subexpansion by the 
following variant, that is equivalent with subexpansion whenever success holds. 
If a E Koa and Koa J -,f/, then (Koa)?+/ C Ko(a A /3) (guarded subexpan- 
sion). 
?3. Constructions. In this section, we are going to introduce five constructions 
of non-prioritized revision on belief sets. The first of these is the most general one. 
Its basic assumption is simply that some inputs are accepted, whereas others are 
not. Those that are accepted form the set V of credible sentences. This will be called 
credibility-limited revision since the acceptance of inputs is limited to sentences with 
sufficient credibility. 
DEFINITION 1. Let K be a logically closed set of sentences. The operation o on K 
is a credibility-limited revision on K if and only if there is an AGM revision * on K 
(satisfying the six basic postulates) and a set V of sentences such that for all sentences 
a: 
{ K*a if a E 
Koae= Ad K otherwise 
The following are some plausible conditions on W. 
If F- a +-* 3l and a E W, then /l E F (closure under logical equivalence). 
If a E V then Cn({ a}) C V (single sentence closure) Section 1.10 of [12]. 
If a V /l E W, then either a E V or /l E F (disjunctive completeness). 
a E V or -'a E V (negation completeness). 
If a E W, then a Y I (element consistency). 
If Kd a,o then -'a E V (expansive credibility). 
Ifa oEW,thenKoa CtW. 
The generalization of single sentence closure to full logical closure (Cn(F) C W) 
is patently unreasonable; each of a and /l may be credible without a /3 l being so 
(for an obvious example, let /l3- -,a). 
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Our second construction is a modified version of David Makinson's screened 
revision [15]. Makinson made use of a set A of potential core beliefs that are 
immune to revision. The belief set K should be revised by the input sentence a if a 
is consistent with the set A n K of actual core beliefs, otherwise not. In our version, 
we have replaced A n K by a set A of core beliefs. For expository convenience we 
will present this construction as a special case of Definition 1, with the set A of core 
beliefs as the determinant of whether or not a sentence a is a member of the set V 
of credible sentences. 
DEFINITION 2. Let o be a credibility-limited revision operator for K, based on * and 
W. Then it is 
1. an operator of core beliefs revision if and only if there is a set A C Y such that 
a E V iif A Y -,a. 
2. an operator of consistent core beliefs revision if and only if there is a consistent 
set A C 2 such that E V i'ffA -a. 
3. an operator of endorsed core beliefs revision if and only if there is a set A C K 
such that a E V iff A J -,a. 
If K is consistent, then all endorsed core beliefs revisions are also consistent core 
beliefs revisions. 
Our third construction is a modification of epistemic entrenchment. In the 
standard account of entrenchment, due to Peter Gardenfors [5, 6], revision is based 
on a relation < that corresponds to usefulness in inquiry or deliberation, or to the 
amount of epistemic value. 
DEFINITION 3. [5, 6] A standard entrenchment ordering for a belief set Kis a relation 
< on Y that satisfies: 
(EEl) If a < /i and /i < 8, then a < 8 (transitivity). 
(EE2) If a H- /3, then a < /l (dominance). 
(EE3) Either a < a A /: or l < a A /3l (conjunctiveness). 
(EE4) If the belief set K is consistent, then a LK if and only if a < /3 for all /l 
(minimality). 
(EE5) If /i < a for all /i, then H- a (maximality). 
< is the strict and _ the symmetric part of <. A sentence a is maximally entrenched 
according to < if and only if 8 < a for all sentences 8. 
Entrenchment-based revision is usually defined via entrenchment-based contrac- 
tion [5, 6]. However, it is also possible to obtain revision directly from entrenchment, 
as follows [14, 18]: 
(< *1) /l E K*a if and only if either (a - -li) < (a - /3) or -,a. 
Given the standard properties of the entrenchment relation, this is equivalent with: 
(< *2) /l E K*a if and only if either (a - -i) < (a - /i) or -a is maximally 
entrenched. 
To construct non-prioritized entrenchment-based revision, we can make use of 
EE1-EE4 but give up EE5 (maximality). Furthermore, we can use the following 
variant of (< *2). 
DEFINITION 4. o is an entrenchment-based non-prioritized revision operator based 
on < if and only if: 
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(< o) /3 E Koa if and only if either (a -* -/ ) < (a -* /3), or /l E K and -,a is 
maximally entrenched. 
The added condition /l E K is needed to assure that (strong) consistency is given 
priority over success. 
Our fourth construction makes use of the one-to-one correspondence that persists 
between propositions (sets of possible worlds) and belief sets. In a propositional 
approach, operations of belief change are performed on the set IIKII of possible 
worlds. Indeed, the standard AGM revision operator (partial meet revision) of K 
by a corresponds to the selection of a subset of Ilail that is non-empty if Ilall is 
non-empty and equal to IK I]l n IIaII if I I]Kf n IIaII is non-empty [8, 12]. We propose 
to distinguish between credible and incredible worlds, and to require that the latter 
never be included in an outcome proposition. Again, it is convenient to introduce 
the new construction as a special case of credibility-limited revision. 
DEFINITION 5. Let o be a credibility-limited revision operator for the belief set K, 
based on W. Then o is 
1. an operator of credible worlds revision if and only if there is a set 7g ofpossible 
worlds such that: a E V if and only if there is some w E 7/ such that a E w. 
2. an operator of non-empty credible worlds revision if and only if this holds for a 
set 7g + 0 of possible worlds. 
3. an operator of endorsed credible worlds revision if and only if this holds for a 
set 7g such that IIKII C >W. 
If K is consistent, then all endorsed credible worlds revisions are non-empty 
credible worlds revisions. Two plausible additional conditions should be mentioned 
that relate 7g to the outcome of the operation: 
IIKoaH 11 n no g 0 ( outcome credibility). 
IlKoa 11 c 7/g (strong outcome credibility). 
Our fifth and last model is a variant of the previous one. Grove's sphere-based 
operations make use of the simple intuition that the outcome of revising IIKII by 
liall consists of those elements of ljlal that are as close as possible to IJKIl. For that 
purpose, IIKII can be thought of as surrounded by a system of concentric spheres 
[8]. Each sphere represents a degree of closeness or similarity to I1KWI. The outcome 
of revising IIKiI by IlailI should be the intersection of IIa II with the narrowest sphere 
around IIKII that has a non-empty intersection with Ilal 1. The equivalence of this 
construction with the full set of (basic and supplementary) Gardenfors postulates 
is a fundamental result in AGM theory [5]. 
Our modification consists in relaxing the standard requirements on sphere sys- 
tems, so that not all possible worlds are elements of any sphere. 
DEFINITION 6. S is a system of spheres around Th(nS) if and only if it satisfies: 
(Si) 0 S C g(YlL), 
(52) noS E , 
(S3) If G, G' E 5, then either G C G' or G' C G. 
(S4) US E 5, and 
(S5) If Iljjaj n (US) + 0, then S, E S and S, n Ilajj 1 0, where S, = S{G E 
S : G n Ilall # 0}. 
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Entrenchment-based Sphere-based -1 Disjunctive 
Credibility Limited Revision Credibility Limited Revision Factoring 
Endorsed Credible Worlds Strong 
Revision with Strong Regularity 
Outcome Credibility 9Rglrt 
tn orsed Credible Wor s2 
Revision with -Regularity 
Outcome Credibilityv 
Endorsed Core Endorsed Credible Vacuity 
V elief Revision Worlds Revision 
Consistent Core Non-empty Credible Disjunctive 
Belief Revision Worlds Revision Success 
Strong Consistency, 
Core Belief Revision Credible Worlds Revision Strict Improvement, 
Disjunctive Constancy 
Closure, Relative Success, 
Extensional Inclusion, Weak Consistency 
Credible Worlds Revision Preservation, Consistent 
J Expansion, Extensionality 
FIGURE 1. Results from Theorems 11-13. 
For any set A of sentences and sentence ae, A-La is the set of maximal consistent 
subsets of A not implying ae. Intuitively, Sa, is the smallest sphere that contains 
some ae-world. 
DEFINITION 7. Let S be a system of spheres around K. The operator o is a non- 
prioritized sphere-based revision operatorfor S if and only if it satisfies: 
Koa Th(laoell nSal!) if IloaiI n (uS) 0 
K K otherwise 
?4. Representation theorems. This section reports a series of representation re- 
sults through which the postulates of Section 2 and the constructions of Section 
3 are closely knit together. Theorem 8 provides the starting-point, characterizing 
essentially those credibility-limited revisions that are available within an extensional 
framework. Theorem 10 exhibits some one-to-one correspondences between addi- 
tional revision postulates and additional properties of the set F of credible sentences. 
Theorems 11-13 provide us with a series of axiomatically characterized construc- 
tions of increasing strength. The major results of this section are summarized in 
Figure 1. 
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THEOREM 8. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an operation on K. 
Then the following three conditions are equivalent: 
1. o satisfies closure, relative success, inclusion, weak consistency preservation, 
consistent expansion, and extensionality. 
2. There is an AGM revision operator *for K and a set V C Y that is closed under 
logical equivalence, and such that o is the credibility-limited revision induced by 
* and W. 
3. There is an AGM revision operator *for Kand a setF C cY that satisfies K c F 
and is closed under logical equivalence, and such that o is the credibility-limited 
revision induced by * and W. 
PROOF. (2)-to-(1): It follows directly from the construction that closure, relative 
success, inclusion, weak consistency preservation, and extensionality are satisfied. 
For consistent expansion, let K ' Koa. Then Koa = K*a and ae E W. It follows 
from the vacuity and success postulates satisfied by * that * satisfies consistent 
expansion. 
(1)-to-(3): Let * be the operation such that 
(i) if ae E Koa, then K*a = Koa, 
(ii) if a 4Koa, then K*a= K*'o for some AGM revision operator *1. 
Furthermore, let V a ae E Koac. We need to show: (Al) that ' is closed 
under logical equivalence, (A2) that K C W, (B) that * is an AGM revision operator, 
and (C) that o is induced by * and W. 
Part Al: To show that V is closed under logical equivalence, let ae E V and let 
F o<-+ /3. Then ae E Koa. It follows from o-closure that /3 c Koa and from 
o-extensionality that Koa = Ko/3. Then /3 E Ko/3, hence /3 E W. 
Part A2: Let ae c K. It follows from relative success that ae E Koat, hence ae E F. 
Part B: This can be proved by verifying that * satisfies the six basic AGM postu- 
lates. 
Part C: There are two cases. (1) If ae c W, then Kot = K*ao. (2) If a HW, then 
ae VKoat. It follows from o-relative success that Kot = K. 
(3)-to-(2): Obvious. - 
It follows from Theorem 8 that the condition K C F has no effects on the 
properties of the operator o. The reason for this should be clear from the following 
observation. 
OBSERVATION 9. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set of sentences and 
* an AGM revision on K. Let 9, and W2 be two sets of sentences. Let 01 be the 
credibility-limited revision based on W, and *, and 02 that based on W2 and *. Then: 
If W, \ K = W2 \ K, then Koloa = Ko2o for all a. 
The proof of this observation is left to the reader. 
THEOREM 10. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an operation on 
K. Then the following pairs of conditions are equivalent: 
1. o satisfies closure, relative success, inclusion, weak consistency preservation, 
consistent expansion, extensionality and 
(a) If a c Kooa and a F- /3, then /3 c Ko/3 (strict improvement). 
(b) If a V /3 c Ko(at V /3), then either a c Kooa or /3 E Ko/3 (disjunctive 
distribution). 
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(c) Either a E Koa or -,a c Ko-'a (disjunctive success). 
(d) Koa 1 1 (strong consistency). 
(e) If -a 4K, then Koa = K+a (vacuity). 
2. There is an AGM revision operator *for Kand a set V C Y that is closed under 
logical equivalence and satisfies 
(a) If oa c E then Cn({ca4) C V (single sentence closure). 
(b) If a V fi c E, then either a c V or f8 c E (disjunctive completeness). 
(c) Either a c V or -,a c V (negation-completeness). 
(d) If a E A, then ae 1 1 (element consistency). 
(e) If KY a, then -,a E V (expansive credibility). 
and such that o is the credibility-limited revision induced by * and W. 
The proofs of the various parts of Theorem 10 follow directly by adding the 
respective condition to the construction introduced in the proof of Theorem 8. 
THEOREM 11. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an operation on 
K. Then thefollowingfour conditions are equivalent: 
1. o satisfies closure, relative success, inclusion, strong consistency, consistent 
expansion, extensionality, strict improvement, and disjunctive distribution. 
2. There is an AGM revision operator *for K and a set V C Y that is closed under 
logical equivalence, and satisfies single sentence closure, disjunctive complete- 
ness and element consistency, and such that o is the credibility-limited revision 
induced by * and W. 
3. It is a core beliefs revision. 
4. It is a credible worlds revision. 
The postulates listed in Theorem 11 will be referred to as the core postulates. 
Weak consistency preservation could be redundantly added to the core postulates, 
since it follows from strong consistency. 
PROOF OF THEOREM 11. (1)-to-(2) and (2)-to-(1): Directly from Theorems 8 and 
10. 
(2)-to-(3): Let the three conditions hold. Let A a o: -,a4W}. Then a E V 
iff -,a4A. In order to prove that ae c V if A -,a it is sufficient to show that 
A = Cn(A). By element consistency, IOW, so that T c A and hence A e4 0. Let 
ae c Cn(A). We assume compactness. Since A is non-empty, there are ,Bl, .. ,AnE 
A such that {,Ilh . /.. } F- Ca. We need to show that ae c A. 
It follows from fil ... . fin E A that -,fl .. - ',fin ]B . It follows from repeated 
use of disjunctive completeness that -,fll V ... V -'fin X'- 
Suppose that -oa c W. Then, since -oa F- -,ih V ... V -jn single sentence closure 
yields -,fll V ... V -'fin c W, contrary to what was just shown. We may conclude 
that -,a4o, hence ae c A. This finishes the proof. 
(3)-to(2): We need to show that all core beliefs revisions satisfy the three postu- 
lates. Let the operator be one of core beliefs revision, i.e., let there be some A such 
that ae E V iff A Y -,a. 
To show that single sentence closure is satisfied, let ae c V and F- ae - /. Then 
a c V yields A Y -'0, and F- a - fi yields F- -'f - . Hence A Y -'3 so that 
# CF 
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To show that disjunctive completeness is satisfied, let ae V fl E W. It follows from 
the definition of core beliefs revisions that A k -,(a V fl), hence A Y -,a A -,f/, hence 
either A j -,a or A Y -,f/. In the former case, ae E W, in the latter /3 C W. 
To show that element consistency is satisfied, let a F- 1. Then A F- -,a, hence 
a bW. 
(3)-to-(4): Let the operator be a core beliefs revision. Let /& = IIA Il. We then 
have ae E V if A Y -,a, if there is some w E Ad such that w Y -'cv, if there is some 
w E 7w such that ae E w. 
(4)-to-(3): Let the operator be a credible worlds revision. Let A = Th(7/). 
Then ae E F if there is some w E Hi such that ae E w, if there is some w E Hi 
such that w -,, iffTh() -,a, iff A -'ct. - 
COROLLARY 1. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an operation on 
K. Then the following four conditions are equivalent: 
1. o satisfies the core postulates and disjunctive success. 
2. There is an AGM revision operator *for K and a set V C Y that is closed under 
logical equivalence, and satisfies single sentence closure, disjunctive complete- 
ness, element consistency and negation completeness, and such that o is the 
credibility-limited revision induced by * and W. 
3. It is a consistent core beliefs revision. 
4. It is a non-empty credible worlds revision. 
COROLLARY 2. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an operation on 
K. Then the following four conditions are equivalent: 
1. o satisfies the core postulates and vacuity. 
2. There is an A GM revision operator * for K and a set F C Y that is closed under 
logical equivalence, and satisfies single sentence closure, disjunctive complete- 
ness, element consistency, and expansive credibility, and such that o is the 
credibility-limited revision induced by * and W. 
3. It is an endorsed core beliefs revision. 
4. It is an endorsed credible worlds revision. 
It should be noted that disjunctive success follows from vacuity. 
THEOREM 12. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an endorsed 
credible worlds revision on K. Then: 
1. o satisfies regularity if and only if it o is an endorsed credible worlds revision 
satisfying outcome credibility. 
2. o satisfies strong regularity if and only if it is an endorsed core beliefs revision 
that satisfies strong outcome credibility. 
PROOF. Part 1, from the postulates to the construction: We will use the same 
construction as in Theorem 8, but with the further specification that *' (the revision 
operator for residual cases) is defined so that K*'o = Cn({ca4) if -- C K (it can 
easily be checked that this is an AGM operator). It remains to be shown that 
outcome credibility holds, i.e., that jlKoae 11 n 74 :? 0. We can prove that Koal C V 
by assuming /3,W and showing /flKoae. Let flW. Then, Ko/3 = K. It follows 
from K C V that /3XK, hence /fIKofl, and by regularity /flKoat. It follows that 
Koa C W, and thus JlKooa 1 n o 7/ :#0. 
This content downloaded from 206.212.0.156 on Sat, 31 Aug 2013 13:36:37 PM
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
1590 S. 0. HANSSON, E. L. FERME, J. CANTWELL, AND M. A. FALAPPA 
Part 1, from the construction to the postulates: It follows from the construction 
that for all ae, if a E A, then Koa C W. Let f8 E Koat. There are two cases: 
Case 1, ad d. Then Kot = K and f8 E K. Since this is an endorsed core beliefs 
revision, it is also an endorsed credible worlds revision (see Corollary 2 of Theorem 
I 1), i.e., IIKII C Ad . Since K is consistent, it follows that IIKII n me 4 0, and since 
IIKII C IlI/I it follows from this that /I In meg y4 0 or equivalently W3 E A, from 
which follows fl E Kofl. 
Case 2, a E W. Then Koa = K*a. It follows that K*a C A, hence Koa C W. 
Since /3 E Koat it follows that ca E W, hence /3 C Kofl. 
Part 2, from the postulates to the construction: Let strong regularity be satisfied. 
We can, without loss of generality, assume that o is an endorsed credible worlds 
revision based on a set A/d of credible worlds such that Ad = IITh(7FW) (to 
see this, note that there is a w such that ae E w E Ad if there is a w such that 
a Ew E IITh (7g) II). 
Let /3 E Th (m/y). Then Th (m/y) C /3 I 1, consequently 7/f C /3 1j, from which 
it follows that Ad n -4 3s I I 0. It follows from the definition of Ad that -,f /Ko -,f. 
Applying strong regularity to this we obtain /3 E Koat. Hence we have proved that 
Th(7/g) C Koca. From this follows IIKoa II C 7/g. 
Part 2, from the construction to the postulates: Let -BNKoca. From -'f/3Koca 
follows IIKoc I I -$/3 I 1, and then from strong outcome credibility (I Koa I C 7/) 
that / : I-,'/I , hence 7/K n lI I :4 0, equivalently /3 C W, from which follows 
fl E Kofl. - 
Results from Theorems I I and 12 are diagrammatically summarized in Figure 2. 
In endorsed credible worlds revision, the set of credible worlds is a superset of the 
set IIKII of worlds compatible with the belief set. If IIaII intersects with IIKIl, then 
the outcome of revision is equal to the belief set corresponding to IIKII n IIaj1, see 
(1) in the figure. If IIafI does not intersect with Ad, as in (3), then the outcome is 
IIKI . In the intermediate case, when 11 II intersects with Ad but not with IIKI , the 
outcome may be a proposition that either (2a) consists only of credible worlds, (2b) 
consists in part of credible and in part of incredible worlds, or (2c) consists only 
of incredible worlds. A good case can be made that (2c), and perhaps also (2b), 
should be excluded. Regularity corresponds exactly to the exclusion of case (2c) 
and strong regularity to the exclusion of both cases (2b) and case (2c). 
THEOREM 13. Let K be a consistent and logically closed set and o an operator on 
K. Then the following three conditions are equivalent: 
1. o satisfies the core postulates and vacuity, strong regularity, and disjunctive 
factoring. 
2. o is an entrenchment-based non-prioritized revision in the sense of Definition 4, 
based on an entrenchment relation < on K that satisfies properties EEl-EE4. 
3. o is a sphere-based revision operator around K in the sense of Definitions 6-7. 
The following lemmas are needed for the proof of the theorem. The proofs of the 
lemmas are left to the reader. 
LEMMA 14. Let < be a relation on Y that satisfies transitivity, dominance and 
conjunctiveness. Then: 
1. It satisfies intersubstitutivity (If a +-+ a' c Cn(0) and /3 <-+ /3' c Cn(0), then 
a < /3 if and only if a/ < /3') [7]. 
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FIGURE 2. Results from Theorems 11 and 12. 
2. It satisfies connectedness (Either a < /3 or /3 < a) [6]. 
3. --a < (a -* /3) holds if and only if (a -* -'/3) < (a -* /3) [12]. 
4. T < a holds if and only if there is no a such that a < a. 
5. If a < /,3 then a-o A aA . 
6. If a < /l anda < 6, then a < /3 Aa [7]. 
7. Il{a : a < 6}l1 C H/3lHI if and only if a < /3. 
8. If < satisfies minimality (EE4) with respect to a consistent belief set K, then 
K={/3S:I< /3}. 
LEMMA 15. Let o satisfy vacuity, relative success, strict improvement and strong 
consistency. Then it satisfies: If a A /3 E Ko-i(a A /3) then /3 E Ko-i/3. 
LEMMA 16. Let Kbe a consistent belief set, and let o satisfy closure, vacuity, relative 
success, extensionality, disjunctive inclusion, and strong consistency. Then it satisfies: 
If -,fl E Ko/3, then -,f/ E Ko (a V /3). 
LEMMA 17. Let o satisfy vacuity. Then it satisfies: If a E Ko-i (a A /3), then a E K. 
LEMMA 18. (Modified from [2]) Let D be a non-empty subset of 9A(y) such that 
(1) for all X in D, X = II Th(X)HI, and (2) for all elements X and Y of D, either 
X C Y or Y C X. Furthermore, let a E 5. Then: If nD C Ila II then there is some 
element X of D such that X C Iljafl. 
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PROOF OF THEOREM 13. (1)-to-(2) From postulates to entrenchment: We assume 
that the postulates given in (1) hold for a given operator o, and we let < be defined 
as follows: 
a < 3 iff: If a E Ko-i(a A A S), then /EKo- (a AA ) 
We need to show that EE1-EE4 hold and that o is entrenchment-based on < in the 
sense of Definition 4. This is straightforward except for EEL. To show that EE1 
holds, let a <,< ? and a E Ko- (a Aa). Weneedtoprovethata6 E Ko-i(a Aa). 
There are two cases. 
Case 1, a E Ko-(6a A /3): Since a < /3 we then have /3 E Ko-i(a A /3). By 
closure, a A /3 E Ko- (a A /3). Lemma 15 yields /3 E Ko- i/ and Lemma 16 yields 
/3 E Ko-i(/ Aa). Since /3 < 6, it follows that a E Ko-i(/ Aa). By closure, 
/3 A a E Ko -i(/ Aa). Lemma 15 then yields a E Ko%-, and Lemma 16 yields 
a E Ko-i(a A s). 
Case 2, a Ko- (a A /3): It then follows from Lemma 16 that a VKo-'a. We are 
going to assume for reductio that s VKo- (a A 5). It then follows directly by Lemma 
16 that b Ko-%. Lemma 15 then yields /3 A Ko-'(/3 A 5). Since /3 < 6, we can 
conclude from this (using closure) that /3fKo-- (/3 A 5). We are going to show (1) 
that a E Ko- (a A /3 A 6) and (2) that a Ko-i(a A /3 A 6). 
Ad 1: Since a E Ko- (a A a), Lemma 17 yields a E K. Hence by relative success 
and closure, a E Ko(a A -i/3). By assumption, a E Ko-((a A 5). Due to disjunctive 
overlap (that follows from disjunctive factoring), Ko-'(a A 5) n Ko(a A -,/3) C 
Ko- (a A/3 A A), hence a E Ko-(a A / A a). 
Ad 2. It follows from disjunctive factoring and extensionality that 
Ko-i(a A /3 A a) is equal to one of Ko-(a A /3) n Ko-,a, Ko-'(a A /3) and Ko- a. 
Since, as we have just seen, aVKo-'(a A /3) and aVKo-A, it follows that either 
a Ko- (a A /3 A ) or a Ko (a A /3 A a). In the former case we are done. In 
the latter case, we also have /3 A a Ko- (a A /3 A 6), and it follows by disjunc- 
tive inclusion (that follows from disjunctive factoring and vacuity in the presence 
of the core postulates) and extensionality that Ko- (a A /3 A ) C Ko-, (/ A 6). 
Since f/3Ko-i (/ A 6) as shown above, it follows that /f3Ko- (a A /3 A 6), hence 
due to closure and extensionality a A /3fKo(-,(a A /3) V -,6). It follows from dis- 
junctive inclusion that Ko(-'(a A /3) V -,6) C Ko-'(a A /3). Extensionality yields 
Ko- (a A /3 A s) C Ko- (a A /f). Since in this case a VKo- (a A /f), it follows that 
a VKo- (a A /3 A s). This is the contradiction we needed. 
(2)-to-(1) From entrenchment to postulates: Let < be an entrenchment relation 
satisfying EE1-EE4 with respect to K, and let o be the operator that is based on < in 
the manner of Definition 4. We need to show that the listed postulates hold. This 
is straightforward except for closure and disjunctive factoring. 
For closure, let 'p E Cn(Koa). Then there is, by compactness of the underlying 
logic, a finite subset {/3i, . . . , /3n } of Koa such that {/3i, . . . , fln } P W. Using the 
above definition of our entrenchment-based revision o, we can show that if /,1 E Koa 
and 62 E Koa, then /3l A /32 E Koa. By iteration, /3, A ... A /3n E Koa, from which 
it can be shown that p E Koa. 
As for disjunctive factoring, there are three cases: 
Case 1, aVKoa and /f3Ko/3. From aVKoa follows, via the definition of o, that 
a -* -'a ~z a -o- a, hence by connectedness and intersubstitutivity T < -,a hence 
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by- dominance -, is maximal. It follows from Definition 4 that a VK. Hence, 
according to the same definition, for all 6, s E Koa iff s E K, hence Koa = K. It 
follows in the same way that Ko/3 = K. We need to show that Ko (a V /3) = K. 
Case la, let both -, and -,B/ be maximally entrenched. Then it follows by 
conjunctiveness that -, A -,B is maximally entrenched. Since -a A -'/3 is maximally 
entrenched, it follows from dominance that so is (a V ,B) -, -,6 for all 6. It then 
follows from Definition 4 that Ko (a V /3) = K. 
Case lb, -a is not maximally entrenched. We then have -a < T, hence -a < 
a --> a, hence by the definition of o, a E Koa = K. Since K is logically closed 
it follows that a V /B E K. Since K is consistent, vacuity yields Ko (a V /3) = 
K+(a V /3) = K. 
Case 2, a VKoa and /3 E Ko/3. We are first going to show that it is not the case 
that /3 E K and -,B/ is maximally entrenched. Suppose to the contrary that this 
is the case. Since K is consistent, it then follows from minimality that -,'/ is not 
minimal. Then according to minimality -,B3 E K, contrary to the consistency of K. 
We may conclude from this contradiction that it is not the case that /3 E K and -'/3 
is maximal. 
Hence, since /3 E Ko/3, we can conclude from the definition of o that /3 -, -'/3 < 
/B -, /3, hence by intersubstitutivity -,Bf < T. By dominance, -'a A -, < ?,Bf, hence 
by transitivity -,a A -,'/ < T. Since T < -,a it follows from conjunctiveness and 
dominance that -'a A -,'/ -i -_,/. By intersubstitutivity, -,(a V /3)- -,B. 
Let a be any sentence. By dominance, since -'a is maximal, so is a -, 6. 
Hence by conjunctiveness and dominance, (a -, a) A (/3 -, a) (/3 -, 5). By 
intersubstitutivity, (a V /3 -, a) =- (/3 -, 5). Hence for all 6, -,B < ,B , 5 if and 
only if -'(a V /3) < (a V /3) -, 6. Since neither -'a A -,B/ nor -,B/ is maximal, it 
follows from the definition of o that for all 6, a E Ko (a V /3) iff a E Ko/3. 
Case 3, a E Koa and /3 E Ko/3: Using the symmetry of this case, we have two 
subcases. 
Case 3a, -'a < -,'/: For one direction, let a E Koa. Then, since -'a is not 
maximal, according to the definition of o we have -'a < a 6 a. It also follows 
from -'a < -,'/, by part 5 of Lemma 14 that -'a -'a A -,'/. Since dominance 
yields -,'/ < ,B 6 , we can use transitivity to obtain both -'a A -,'/ < ,B -, a and 
-'a A -'/ < a 6 a. Conjunctiveness yields -'a A -,'/ < (a -, s) A (/3 -, s), hence 
by intersubstitutivity -'a A -,' < (a V /3 -, s), hence a E Ko (a V /3). 
For the other direction, let a E Ko (a V /3). It follows from -'a < -,'/ that 
-'a A -'/3- -a, hence -a A -,'/ is not maximal, hence it follows from a E Ko (a V /3) 
that -A AB/< aV/3 -,a 6. Bydominance, a V/3 , -s < a -,a 6. Transitivityyields 
-'a < a -* a, hence a E Koa. 
Case 3b, -'a - ',. Then -'a _- ,B= ',a A -'/3. For one direction, let 
a E Koa n Ko/3. Then -'a < a -, a and -,'/ < ,B 6 a. Then by dominance 
and transitivity -'a A -,'/ < a -s a and -'a A -,'/ < ,B 6 a. Conjunctiveness and 
dominance yield -'a A -,' < a V /3 -, a. Hence a E Ko (a V /3). 
For the other direction, let a E Ko (a V /3). Then we have -'a A -,' < a V /3 , a. 
We already know that -,/- -'a A -,'/, and dominance yields a V /3 -, a < ,B 6 a. 
Using transitivity to combine this, we obtain -,/3 < ,B -, a, hence a E Ko/3. 
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(2)-to-(3) From entrenchment to spheres: Let < be a relation on Y that satisfies 
EE1-EE4 with respect to the consistent belief set K. Furthermore, let S< be the set 
such that X E S< iff it satisfies the following four conditions: 
(S<1) IIKfl C X. 
(S<2) X = n{lial : X C flalj}. 
(S<3) X C 9(YII). 
(S<4) For all a, /5 E A, if X C Ila II and a < ,6, then X C 
Let S,, = nG E < : G n II aH I 0}, and let Th(nS<) = K. We need to prove that 
S< is a sphere system around K, i.e., that it satisfies S1-S5, and that the revision 
operator based on it, for all inputs, yields the same outcome as the entrenchment- 
based revision operator based on < in the manner of Definition 4 (note in what 
follows that 11{6: a < 6}11 = n{f 11: a < 6_). 
In order to show S4, first show that: If I < a, then I : a < } e E<. 
Given S4, S1 and S5 follow directly. The proof of S3 is also straightforward. The 
same applies to S2 if we first use Lemma 18 to prove that for any non-empty subset D 
of 5<, it holds that nD E 5<. Given S2, we can prove that Th(nS<) = K. It remains 
to prove revision-equivalence. For that purpose, let o< be the credibility-limited 
revision operator based on < in the manner of Definition 4, i.e., 
ffl {: -,a < a } if-,a<T 
Ko<a {s a }K otherwise 
Let os< be the operator based on S< in the manner for Definition 7, i.e., let 
Th(lell n S.) if flail n (US<) 0 
Ia { Th(H ,)K otherwise 
We need to show that for all a, Ko< a = Kos< a. This can be done with the help of 
the following two intermediate results: (1) a < T iff US< Ha j1, (2) If -,' < T. 
then S,,= ntrIgI11 : -,a < 5}. 
(3)-to-(2) From spheres to entrenchment. Given the sphere system S around K, 
we define the following entrenchment relation for K: 
a < / iff it holds for all S E S that if S C Iloal then S C H/ 5H . 
It is easy to verify that < satisfies EE1-EE4. It remains to show that the entrenchment- 
based operator o< that it gives rise to is identical with the sphere-based operator os 
that is based on S. 
For one direction of that proof, let /5 E Kosa. We have two cases. 
First case, US II 1--a1. Then /S E Th(S,,, n a), hence S,, n 1afl C H/5HI so that 
So, C I-,a V flI. By definition, S,, $ 1-,aI. 
It follows from EE2 (dominance) that -'a < -a V fl. From S., C I-,a V /lS and 
So, I_ Sa 11 follows that -'a V /< -'a does not hold, hence -'a < -,a V /5. It follows 
from the definition of o< that /5 E Ko< a. 
Second case, US C II-aHII. Then Kos a = Kby the definition of os, hence E K. 
Next, let S be any sphere such that S C JITIH. Then S C US C II-,all. Hence 
T < -a. 
For the other direction, let /5 E Ko<a. According to the definition of o< there 
are two cases. 
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First case, -, < a - ,B. Rewriting this condition, using the definition above of 
<, it holds (a) that for all G E S, if G C II-a I then G C 1-,a V /3, and (b) that 
there is some G' E S such that G' C II-a V flil and G' Z I-,all. 
It follows from G' Z 11-'al that G' n Ilall + 0, so that Sa, C G'. Hence 
So, C 11-ia V /11 = 11-iall U llflll, hence Sa, n tlal C fl/3i, from which follows that 
,B E Th(S. n 01ajj). We also know from G' Z II-,al that G' n Ilall + 0, hence 
(US) n IIak I 0. It follows from this and ,B E Th(S,0a n II) that ,B E Kos a. 
Second case, T < -,a and /B E K. Let G E S. Then it follows from T < -a 
and the definition of < that if G C flTfl then G C II-,all. Since G C JITHJ is true 
for all G E 5, it follows that G C II-iaI for all G E 5, hence US C II-iaIl, so that 
(uS) n liall = 0. 
It follows by EE4 (minimality) from ,B E K, i.e., (by part 8 of Lemma 14) 1 </, 
by the definition of <, that there is some G E S such that G C /3 j. Hence 
nS C 1/3fl, so that /3 E Th(nS) = K. It follows from this and (US) n 'a= 0 that 
/B e Koa. A 
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